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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff / Appellee 
vs. 
MARK SCOTT * 
Defendant / Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The defendant was charged with eight crimes: four counts of Burglary, 
second degree felonies and four counts of Theft. Two counts are Second Degree 
felonies and two counts Class B misdemeanors. 
The defendant was convicted on all counts. The Court sentenced the 
defendant to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the second 
degree felonies and six months in the Cache County jail on the Class B 
misdemeanors. The Court ordered the sentences to run concurrent. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 78A-4-
103(2)(J) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: L The trial court erred when they failed to grant the defendant's 
motion to dismiss the case based upon the state failing to prevent sufficient 
evidence that the defendant was involved in the crimes. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Appellate Case No. 20070740-CA 
Standard of Review regarding challenges to Witnesses. The application of these 
rules by the trial court is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. 
Hovater, 914 P. 2d 37, 41 (Utah 1996) 
Standard of Review regarding Findings of Fact is reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous, State v. Genovesi, 871 P. 2d 547 (Utah App. 1994) 
Issue: II Was the trial counsel ineffective for failing to file a motion to arrest 
the judgment 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as 
a matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two 
part test, which was adopted in State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). 
to determine whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, 
the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 
2d at 693. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.C.A. 76-6-202 BURGLARY, 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony: 
(b) theft:... 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
U.C.A 76-6-404 THEFT. 
A person commits theft if he obtained or exercised unauthorized control 
over the property of another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the 
actor has been twice before convicted of theft or it is a class B misdemeanor if the 
value is less than $300 and it is a Second degree felony if the value is greater than 
$5,000.00. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
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cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole 
4 
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the 
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens 
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of 
age in such State. 
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as 
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to 
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall 
not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or 
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
The appellant was charged by way of information with eight counts. R. 1. 
The defendant proceeded to have a jury trial. At the trial the defendant was 
convicted of eight counts. R. 172. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. In November of 2005, the State alleged Mr. Scott along with his son 
Chris Scott, went to an area up Blacksmith Fork Canyon, in Cache 
County. They alleged Mr. Scott with his son broke into cabins in that 
area on four different occasions with the intent to commit a theft and did 
indeed steal items from theses cabins in the excess value of $5,000 
dollars and on two occasions stole firearms. R. 107. 
2. The State called a Mr. Dennis Weaver to testify R. 207 P. 120-154. Mr. 
Weaver owned a cabin that was burglarized. We set forth the portion of his 
testimony that helped the State's case and the portion that hurt their case. 
a. The portion of his testimony which was helpful to the State's case is as 
follows: Mr. Weaver testified that he knows defendant because he 
renting land to him in Weber County for defendant to store vehicles on. 
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He testified that defendant stored 80+ cars on property and city asked Mr. 
Weaver to have them moved. Mr. Weaver gave defendant $200 so he 
could pay rent on new piece of land to move the cars to. He testified that 
his family gave defendant food and gifts for Christmas one year. Mr. 
Weaver reported a break-in October 26th 2005, and nothing was stolen. He 
testified that in December he noticed two cabin doors had signs of forced 
entry, several cans of food, several batteries used for powering cabin, 
valuables from his wife's jewelry box, a Craftsmen power drill, three 
flashlights, a .22 rifle, two pairs of binoculars, a spotting scope etc... He 
testifies that defendant has been to his cabin and knows where it is. 
b. The portion of his testimony that was detrimental to the State's case is as 
follows On cross-examination Mr. Weaver admitted that the Craftsmen 
power drill that was returned to him by the police only looked like his. He 
couldn't confirm that it was definitely his via serial number etc.. R. 207 P. 
133 Mr. Weaver identified a flashlight in a photo that he stated was 
missing when he visited his cabin in December. He then states that he 
didn't actually know that the flashlight was missing until it was returned to 
him by the police, so his previous statement about it missing when he 
visited the cabin in December couldn't be true. This calls into question the 
statements he makes about noticing things missing on that visit in 
December. 
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c. Furthermore, Mr. Weaver can't explain why he assumed that the gate lock 
had been drilled. He testifies that police didn't make contact with him for 
3-5 days after he reported the incident. 
3. The State called a Mr. Roger to testify R. 207 P. 155-184. Mr. Weaver owned 
a cabin that was burglarized. We set forth the portion of his testimony that 
helped the State's case and the portion that hurt their case. 
a. The portion of his testimony that was helpful to the State's case is as 
follows: He testified that the cabin was broken into and a drill with 
batteries, solar panels, liquor, an air compressor (which he identified by 
markings), light fixtures (has box it was shipped in with his name on it), a 
satellite dish, a jig saw, a Big Tex trailer, DVDs, black powder pistol, a 
crossbow and long bow with arrows, knives, a pair of walkie-talkies, .22 
ammo, two pairs of binoculars, etc., were stolen. 
b. The portion of his testimony that is helpful to the defendant and hurts his 
credibility as a witness is his own wrongdoing. - He admitted that he has 
since been prosecuted for giving a false accounting of what was missing to 
law enforcement. He also admitted to committing a theft thirty years ago. 
He had stolen a TV as collateral from a friend who owed him money. On 
Cross-Examination, he testified that he was going to try to collect 
insurance money for the trumped up value of the items missing. He didn't 
think that the police was going to recover the items so he tried to use a 
fraudulent insurance claim to recoup some money. He added numerous 
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expensive things to the list of missing items that he had never owned. He 
was charged with providing false information to a police officer and was 
on probation when he testified. R. 207 P. 174. 
4. The State called a Cynthia Scott to testify R. 207 P. 185-213 . Ms. Scott was 
the defendant's ex-wife. They were married for 18 years and were in a 
custody battle when she testified. We set forth the portion of her testimony 
that helped the State's case and the portion that hurt their case, 
a. The portion of her testimony that was beneficial to the State is as follows: 
She testified that Mr. Weaver helped the family a great deal by providing 
property for them to stay on, food, and help in finding odd jobs for Mark 
Scott to do. She testified that her son Christopher and Mr. Weaver were 
good friends. She testified that Mark told her, in Christopher's presence, 
that he was going to see what he could get out of Mr. Weaver because he 
thought that he owed him for what he lost on the property they were 
staying at. She testifies that some time after saying this he came home 
with several items that matched the description of what had been stolen 
from Mr. Weaver's cabin, like canned food, clothes, liquor, and a rifle. R. 
207 P. 189. She testified that upon returning home with these items he 
told her that he saw some other cabins that he wanted to check out. He 
left the next night with his sons Brandon and Christopher and came back 
with more items. She testified that she has seen the rifle in her trailer 
before and after she left the defendant. R. 207 P. 201 
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b. The portions of her testimony that would be beneficial to defendant is as 
follows: On Cross-Examination, She testified that she and her son 
Christopher left Mark Scott in July 2006 and moved in with a Jeff Evans 
whom she was romantically involved with. It wasn't until November of 
2006 that she took Christopher to the police so he could tell them about 
the thefts at the cabin. She did not give any information about what the 
defendant had allegedly said about getting something out of Mr. Weaver's 
cabin, her son's Brandon's involvement, or the items that were brought to 
her home by the defendant. At this trial was the first time that she offered 
any of these facts. She testified that she has a felony conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. This charge took place in July of 2006 
around the time that she left the defendant. She admitted that her 
methamphetamine conviction will negatively impede her desire to get 
custody of Christopher. She admits to providing Christopher with 
methamphetamines and using them with him. She states that the last time 
Christopher used drugs was over a year ago. She testified that Christopher 
has never had a truancy problem then admits moments later that he 
actually had one when he was in the eighth grade. R. 207 P. 203. 
5. The State called Christopher Scott to testify R. 208 P. 3-49. Christopher 
Scott is die defendant's son who admitted to committing these crimes with his 
father. We set forth the portion of his testimony that helped the State's case 
and the portion that hurt their case. 
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a. The portion of his testimony that was beneficial to the State's case is as 
follows: He testified the defendant talked about burglarizing Mr. Weaver's 
cabin. He testified he and the defendant broke into and burglarized some 
cabins in October 2005. He testified that the defendant drilled out the 
locks on the gate to get in. At that time, they stole some canned food. He 
testified that the defendant used bolt cutters to remove the lock from Mr. 
Weaver's gate. He testified the defendant pried the back door of Mr. 
Weaver's cabin open with a pry bar when they burglarized it in December 
2005. He testified he and the defendant stole batteries out of Mr. 
Weaver's cabin and loaded them into the defendant's Bronco. He testified 
they stole food, a .22 rifle, a spotting scope, a power inverter, and a pair of 
binoculars. He testified that he saw the rifle they stole in Ricochet 
Trucking's shop. He testified the following day he and the defendant 
burglarized Mr. Godfrey's cabin. He testified that they stole a Honda 
generator, two solar panels, batteries, food, alcohol, a trailer, and a .22 
rifle. He testified that the defendant, Brandon, and he went back to Mr. 
Weaver and Mr. Godfrey's cabins later. On that occasion, they stole a 
large amount of alcohol. He testifies that in 2006 the defendant hit his 
mother. R. 208 P. 30. 
b. The portion of his testimony that is beneficial to the defendant is as 
follows: He testified that when he told the police about these events that 
he told them that the burglaries took place over two nights. This 
contradicts his testimony during this trial because he stated that the 
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burglaries occurred over four nights. He cannot explain the reason for the 
discrepancies in his accounts of the events. He admits that he initially 
omitted Brandon's involvement in the burglaries on the fourth night. He 
admits that his accounts of stealing the rifle and breaking into Mr. 
Weaver's cabin the first time have changed since his original statements to 
the police. During the preliminary hearing, he testified that he and the 
defendant never wore gloves but during the trial, he testifies that they used 
gloves on two occasions. He reads his written statement. R. 208 P. 40. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The appellant asserts that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing the 
charges against him. The testimony of the witnesses for the State were lacking in 
reliability and credibility. One witness attempted to commit insurance fraud and 
lied to the police. The defendant's ex-wife is a drug addict and was attempting to 
get custody of their son. She is a drug dealer and supplied and used drugs with the 
defendant's son. The defendant's son uses drugs, waited over a year before 
reporting this to the police and had many inconsistency in his statements. 
Trial counsel was ineffective for not making a motion to arrest the 
judgment. 
\2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF 
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTIONS 
CASE FOR REASONS THAT THERE WAS 
INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION. 
The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in 
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The court's 
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient 
evidence is limited." State v. Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192, 196 (2000). The Utah 
Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 27 P3d 
1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, "ordinarily, a 
reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but 
must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict." 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate 
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Court may overturn a conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a 
conviction of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not 
legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote 
or speculative possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented 
no evidence, expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have 
been taken for purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the 
Court vacated the defendant's guilty verdict. Similarly, in the case of State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a 
defendant in a second degree murder case where the evidence as to intent 
was deficient. In that case there was undisputed evidence that the victim had 
been murdered. The sole evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact 
that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim, and the fact that 
he had related a dream to three individuals in which he recalled slapping the 
girl and that he "thought he hurt her. He thought he might have killed her," 
Id. at 446. In that case, the Court also stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the 
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean 
that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap 
in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its 
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utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 444-445. 
Furthermore, in the case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 
2002) the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of 
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that 
opined that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of 
an individual. No other evidence as to a second weapon (the first 
weapon was recovered) was found, but rather, the prosecution relied 
on an inference that the defendant had the motive and opportunity to 
dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that conviction, the Court 
held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, 
the evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] 
had the opportunity to destroy or conceal the second 
implement, if indeed it ever existed. Id. at 100. 
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even 
with an extensive marshaling of evidence (which he has done in the setting 
forth the facts) the juryfs verdict cannot be supported 
The defense pointed out that it is very obvious in this case that there is 
a lot of inconsistent in testimonies. There were at least a few things said by 
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almost everyone who testified, that were inconsistent with previous 
statements. 
All of this notwithstanding, the State failed to prove all of the 
elements of alleged crimes. For this reason, the trial court should have 
dismissed the case. The evidence was insufficient to convict the Defendant 
of the crimes he was charged with. Furthermore, all three elements of a 
plain error claim are present. The error exists. The error being that the State 
failed to prove all of the elements of the offenses. Number two, this error 
should have been obvious to the trial court. The final element is that the 
error was harmful. Based on the insufficiency of the evidence the Defendant 
should not have been convicted. Therefore, he was prejudiced by the court's 
failure to dismiss the case and his convictions should be reversed. 
The Appellant Court should dismiss the instant case. The appellant has 
marshaled the evidence set forth at the trial. The trial court heard the evidence and 
should have granted the appellant's motion after the State's case in chief. The 
credibility of the State's witnesses was so lacking the Court had a duty to grant 
the motion made by the defendant. 
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Point II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS SEVEN 
AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY HIS 
ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO MOVE THE TRIAL TO 
ARREST THE JUDGMEMT 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In 
Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine 
whether counsel's assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must 
show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave 
some guidance in noting, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 
688. Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the 
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obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney 
performance", Id. at 688, it did mention certain minimal requirements. These 
duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest" as 
well as a duty "to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to 
keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution" Id. at 688. Additionally, the overreaching requirement by the 
Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that the 
"performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable 
considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688. 
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's 
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the 
Court was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to 
conduct proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence 
under the 4th Amendment. The Supreme Court found the attorney's 
performance to be deficient. The Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, 
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment 
claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability 
that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable 
evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Kimmelman 
v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 
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In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed 
to comport with constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct 
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only 
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while 
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for 
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under 
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall 
performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not 
affect the soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — 
that counsel's performance fell below the level of reasonable 
professional assistance in the respects alleged. Kimmelman v. 
Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386 (1986). 
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have 
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that 
can guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed 
duties. 
In State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) this Court 
reversed a defendant's conviction under an ineffective assistance of counsel 
theory where counsel "fail[ed] to move for a directed verdict after the State 
failed to present evidence that Smith did not possess a valid concealed 
weapon permit during its case in chief.9' 
In the present case, defense counsel failed to make a motion to arrest 
the judgment. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to make a 
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motion to the trial court that the trial court would have granted, this failure, 
and this failure alone would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the definition of Strickland and it's Federal and State progeny. The 
general practice of defense counsel in criminal trials is to move for a motion 
to arrest the judgment. This is especially true when the conviction is not 
based on substantial reliable evidence. 
"A conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot 
stand." State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1989) (finding 
insufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict convicting the defendant 
of sexual abuse of a child). On a motion to arrest judgment, the court 
may only reverse a jury verdict when "the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he or she was convicted." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 
63, 52 P,3d 1210 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also State v. Workman, 852 P»2d 981, 983 (Utah 1993). "When 
reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of [a motion to] 
arrest. . . judgment, the court should review the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may fairly be drawn there from in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 11, 
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994 P.2d 177; see also State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,1f 40, 52 P.3d 1194 
(stating that court must "assume that the jury believed the evidence 
that supports the verdict"). A jury can convict on the basis of the 
"uncorroborated testimony of the victim." State v. Sisneros, 
581 P.2d 1339, 1343 (Utah 1978); see also Bowles v. Indiana, 737 N.E»2d 
1150,1152 (Ind. 2000) ("A victim's testimony, even if uncorroborated, is 
ordinarily sufficient to sustain a conviction for child molesting."). 
"The standard for determining whether an order arresting judgment 
is erroneous is the same as that applied by an appellate court in 
determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient 
evidence." Workman, 852 P.2d at 984. Normally, a trial court's denial of 
a defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge lends further 
support to the jury's verdict. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 63. 
"Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's 
decision this Court still has the right to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983). Though the court must ordinarily accept the jury's 
determination of witness credibility, when the witness's testimony is 
inherently improbable, the court may choose to disregard it. 
Workman, 852 P.2d at 984. Importantly, when reviewing the sufficiency of 
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the evidence, the "burden of proof... may under appropriate 
circumstances affect the degree of deference extended by an appellate 
court to findings of fact." State ex rel. Z.D. v. State, 2006 UT 54, 
127,147P.3d401, It is "more difficult to demonstrate that the 
evidence supporting a "preponderance* based outcome is so wanting . . . 
than it is to demonstrate the required dearth of evidence under a more 
exacting evidentiary standard." Id,. In a criminal case, where the 
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court may afford 
less deference to inherently improbable, inconsistent, uncorroborated 
witness testimony than in a civil case where the plaintiff must only 
establish its claim by a preponderance of the evidence. "The evidence, 
stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Petree, 659 P.2d at 445. In 
Workman dicta that witness testimony is inherently improbable 
and may likewise be disregarded if it is (1) physically impossible or 
(2) apparently false. 852 P.2d at 984. 
Testimony is physically impossible when what the witness claims 
happened could not have possibly occurred. If Taylor had testified that 
the molestation occurred on the moon, her testimony would have been 
inherently improbable because it is physically impossible for that to 
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have occurred. On the other hand, testimony is apparently false if its 
falsity is "apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." 
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). The court of appeals applied a 
narrow definition of "apparently false," holding that it required the 
testimony to be "improbable by its very nature." State v. Robbins, 
2006 UT App 324, 17,142 P.3d 589. It also held that "the inherently 
improbable testimony must . . . go to the very core of the offense." 
Id. 18. Under this interpretation, unless the witness's testimony is 
impossible, not just incredible, and concerns the core elements of the 
crime, not just the circumstances surrounding it, the judge must uphold 
the juryfs verdict. Such a standard is narrow to the point of being 
meaningless. Substantial inconsistencies in a sole witness's testimony, 
though not directed at the core offense, can create a situation where 
the prosecution cannot be said to have proven the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly as here where other significant 
factors in the case suggest a lack of credibility. 
To prevent unappealable injustice, Utah Courts have held that the 
definition of inherently improbable must include circumstances where a 
witness's testimony is incredibly dubious and, as such, apparently false. 
Accordingly, when considering a motion to arrest judgment, a trial judge 
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may reevaluate the jury's determination of testimony credibility in 
cases "where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony 
that is equivocal or the result of coercion, and there is a complete 
lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt." Bowles, 737 N.E.2d at 1152; 
see also Iowa v. Smith, 508N.W.2d 101,103 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993) (tnThe 
testimony of a witness may be so impossible and absurd and 
self-contradictory that it should be deemed a nullity by the court.1" 
(quoting Graham v. Chi. & Nw. Rv. Co.. 119 N.W. 708, 711 (Iowa 1909))). 
The court may choose to exercise its discretion to disregard inconsistent 
witness testimony only when the court is convinced that the credibility of the 
witness is so weak that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In the present case there is simply no reason for trial counsel not to 
move the court to arrest the judgment when the evidence against the 
Defendant was so unreliable. This failure clearly fulfills the first prong of 
the Strickland test. 
The second prong of the test is whether "counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable." Strickland, at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. Again, in the 
case of State v. Smith, 65 P. 3d 648, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) this Court 
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ruled that "[h]ad trial counsel raised this lack of evidence, there is a 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have dismissed the 
concealed weapon charge." 
In the present case, counsel should have move the court for a 
motion to arrest the judgment The jury should not have found the defendant 
guilty based upon the lack of credible evidence. 
After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the trial counsel should have made 
a motion to arrest the judgment. The reliability and credibility of the witnesses 
was so lacking that the trial attorney should have given the Court another 
opportunity to set aside the jury verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have granted the defendants motion to dismiss the 
case because the inconsistencies and unreliability of the witnesses was so great the 
State failed to prove its case. 
The defendant should have moved the court to arrest the judgment because 
the main witnesses who's testimony was most damaging was unreliable. He had 
waited for over a year to make the false accusation. It was at the insistence of his 
mother who had left the defendant for another man. She wanted to obtain custody 
of her son. He gave conflicting versions of what had occurred. 
DATED this *?() day of April, 2009 
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